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Towards the Role of Self, Worth, and Feelings in  
(Re-)Producing Social Dominance. Explicating  
Pierre Bourdieu's Implicit Theory of Affect 
Sandra Matthäus ∗ 
Abstract: »Zur Rolle von Selbst, Wert und Gefühl im (Re-)Produktionsprozess 
sozialer Herrschaft. Eine Explikation Pierre Bourdieus impliziter Affekttheorie«. 
In this theoretical article it is argued that Pierre Bourdieu’s Social Theory pro-
vides us with a convincing account of how the subjectivated social actor, social 
evaluation procedures, and affective states are inherently intertwined. There-
fore, it contains an implicit theory of affect offering not only a better under-
standing of the role affective states play within sociological theory building, 
but also in the (re-)production of social order, especially in terms of social ine-
quality or social domination in (late) modernity. In doing so, it also illuminates 
processes of social transformation. A twofold analysis is provided: A recon-
struction of Bourdieu’s perspective on the general structure of (late) modernity 
especially emphasizing his (late) modern anthropology, as well as an examina-
tion of his theoretical considerations of the habitus. As a result, on a social 
theoretical level, feelings, emotions, sensations, etc. appear as a specific, parti-
cularly naturalized evaluative social practice. On the level of societal analysis 
feeling appreciated as the result of practically referring appreciatively  towards 
oneself emerges as the legitimate (late) modern subject structure. 
Keywords: Pierre Bourdieu, affect theory, habitus, subject, practices of 
(e)valuation, reproduction of social domination, (late) modernity, social theory. 
1. Introduction 
It is stunning just how much emotions have been neglected within analytic 
commentary on the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), 
especially when it comes to his theory of habitus (e.g., Swartz 1997; Webb, 
Schirato and Danaher, 2002; Krais and Gebauer 2002; Fröhlich and Rehbein 
2009; Lenger, Schneickert and Schumacher 2013; Müller 2014). It is stunning, 
however not because his emotionality influences his work in any unique way, 
as some would like to claim (Brumlik 2009), but because human affectivity 
                                                             
∗  Sandra Matthäus, Department of Comparative Cultural Sociology; European University 
Viadrina Frankfurt, Große Scharrnstr. 59, 15230 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany;  
matthaeus@europa-uni.de.  
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  76 
plays in fact a central role not only in reference to certain aspects of his work 
(Lane 2012), but in his theory as a whole. So, although Bourdieu did not carry 
out explicit systematic studies on this issue, the main thesis of this article is that 
Bourdieu’s writings convey not so much an “anti-affective attitude” (Reckwitz 
2015, 32; my translation), but rather an implicit theory of affect unfolding en 
passant in his analyses of (late) modern society, particularly in his more theo-
retical writings.1 Feelings, emotions, sensations, etc. are therefore not only 
central for explaining the (re-)production and in fact transformation of social 
order in the sense of social inequality or social dominance, consequently deep-
ening our understanding of his theory of habitus. They are also specified by 
Bourdieu very fundamentally and in an extremely insightful manner as intri-
cately intertwined with processes of evaluation, so that Bourdieu’s model actu-
ally goes far beyond many conceptions within the sociology of emotions. 
Hence, Bourdieu’s theory should not be extended too hastily by adding emo-
tions as an extra (e.g., Cottingham 2016; Penz and Sauer 2016; Reay 2000). 
Rather, his implicit theory of affect should be explicated first, since it makes an 
innovative contribution towards a better understanding of the yet somewhat 
puzzling role that affectivity plays within sociological theory building (Reck-
witz 2015), with respect to both the analysis of societies and their social theo-
retical fundamentals, which becomes especially apparent in light of the recent 
development of a sociology of valuation (Lamont 2012; Cefai et al. 2015; Peetz 
et al. 2016). 
Turning towards Bourdieu’s implicit theory of affect will therefore be the 
main task of this article. As a first step, Bourdieu’s considerations regarding the 
general structure of (late) modern society will be reconstructed, for which his 
specific (late) modern anthropology plays a crucial role. In doing so, it can be 
shown that human evaluation processes, especially in their emotional dimen-
sion – fundamentally in terms of feeling appreciated or not – are decisive for 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the (re-)production of (late) modern social domi-
nance. Against this background, and as a second step, an analysis of the role of 
affectivity2 specifically within Bourdieu’s theory of habitus follows, which 
represents his understanding of the subjectivated subject and is considered to 
be the element of his overall theory mainly responsible for explaining the (re-
)production of social order in the sense of social domination. In this analysis, it 
                                                             
1  In fact, Bourdieu seems rather interested in affectivity even at the beginning of his academ-
ic career, as the title of his original PhD thesis, “Emotional Structures of Time”, indicates 
(e.g. Jurt 2009; my translation). 
2  As will become clear hereafter, Bourdieu does not differentiate between different states of 
human emotionality. Since they all fall in the category of perceptions, with perceptions for 
him being always bodily bound, Bourdieu does not establish a systematic difference be-
tween emotions, feelings, sensations, affects, etc. Therefore, my use of these different terms 
also does not mark a systematic difference but is rather for the sake of convenience and 
legibility. 
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will become apparent that it is because of feelings, emotions, sensations, etc., 
that societal structures can be incorporated as well as excorporated, and thus, 
unconsciously reproduced. This is due to Bourdieu’s understanding of affective 
phenomena as part of his corporeal conception of intentionality as the manifes-
tation of (self-)evaluation processes that are essentially what the habitus con-
sists of in (late) modernity. Therefore, to Bourdieu, feelings are basically the 
manifestation of a practical, unconscious, and learned process of self-
evaluation mainly acquired due to evaluation processes during primary sociali-
zation, and in this way an expression of a specific evaluative subject structure 
that is contingent upon its social background of formation. They are, thus, a 
completely naturalized social practice and in this capacity equipped with a 
distinct power to motivate further social practices typically reproducing social 
order. It is in this sense of connecting the subjectivated subject, social evalua-
tion processes, and affectivity in social practice that we speak of here as 
self.worth.feelings. The article ends with a summary of the main arguments and 
a brief outline of their theoretical implications 
2. Bourdieu’s Theory of (Late) Modern Society and Its 
Subject’s Feelings3 
“‘[S]ociety is god’” (Bourdieu 2000, 245). Reaffirming Durkheim’s diagnosis 
of modernity, with this thundering statement, Bourdieu concludes the Pascalian 
Meditations (Bourdieu 2000), arguably his most theoretical work, in which he 
explicitly lays out his “idea of ‘the human being’” (ibid., 8) that underlay his 
writings that is almost completely overlooked in the discussion of his oeuvre.4 
In doing so, he expresses in a nutshell his notion of the fate of modern man as 
influenced by the decline of a divine social order and a parallel rise of the 
recognition or appreciation of others understood as society. In this connection, 
Bourdieu speaks in reference to Pascal of the “‘wretchedness of man without 
God’” (ibid., 239), with this wretchedness grounded in man doomed to be “a 
being without a reason for being haunted by the need for justification, legitima-
tion, recognition” (ibid.), meaning more precisely haunted by the need for the 
                                                             
3  It is especially Reckwitz (2008 2011) who establishes Bourdieu as a representative of subjec-
tivation theory. See here also Section 3.1. Furthermore, although Bourdieu is not a desig-
nated theorist of late modernity, using the construction of “(late) modernity” seems appro-
priate. On the one hand, following Giddens (1991), late modernity represents not so much a 
radical break with modern structures than a process of their radicalization. On the other 
hand, Bourdieu’s studies were carried out at a time typically considered to be the transition 
phase to late modernity. Furthermore, in their capacity as structural analyses they have the 
advantage of detecting profound structures of meaning before they rise to the level of so-
cietal awareness (Oeverman, 2002). 
4  An exception from this is Peters (2011). 
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“‘esteem of men’” (ibid., 238). According to Bourdieu, this appreciation of 
men is, however, “what is rarest” (ibid., 240) in the social world and, thus, of 
greatest value in that world. Therefore, in a society without a firm divine order 
and an increased idea among society’s members that they can influence their 
own fate, hence their social position, such a society is dominated by a “symbol-
ic struggle of all against all in which what is at stake is the power of naming, or 
categorization, in which everyone stakes his being, his value, the idea he has of 
himself” (ibid., 238, original emphasis) and this in order to enforce categories 
of valuation, against which one can appear valuable. This is due to Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization of social order as being made up of “categories of perception 
and appreciation” (Bourdieu 1996a, 483) that he equates with “the social world 
itself” (ibid.). Consequently, perception beyond these categories of apprecia-
tion does not exist, or, to put it differently, any kind of perception contains 
evaluations so that processes of perception are always also processes of evalua-
tion.5 Thus, society is ultimately a hierarchical system of classifications deter-
mining relationally the worth of any of its entities, hence, determining what is 
seen as how valuable, as how legitimate. It is for this reason that Bourdieu 
speaks of symbolic dominance, for which the notion of the legitimate subject is 
the most fundamental dimension – social “[c]onflicts […] would not be so 
dramatic […] if they did not involve the ultimate values of the person, a highly 
sublimated form of interests” (ibid., 310). 
Now, this central appreciation of others exhibits an intricate relationship 
with affectivity. That is to say that according to Bourdieu, appreciation to the 
portrayed extent matters precisely because it is felt. This can be seen for exam-
ple when Bourdieu states, “[o]ne of the most unequal of all distributions, and 
probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of symbolic capital, 
that is, of social importance and of reasons for living” (Bourdieu 2000, 241; 
emphasis added); or when he writes that “[a]ll the manifestations of social 
recognition […] saves those it touches from the distress of an existence without 
justification” (ibid.; emphasis added), and that there is “no worse disposses-
sion, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers in the symbolic strug-
gle for recognition, for access to a socially recognized social being, in a word, 
to humanity” (ibid.; emphasis added). Therefore, ‘to feel’ means ‘to recognize’ 
– to recognize in practice, i.e. practically recognize – that social order against 
which the social subjects are to be endowed with more or less value and thus 
with more or less legitimacy. 
This becomes even more apparent when Bourdieu states that the “effect of 
consecration [is] capable of rescuing one from the sense of the insignificance 
and contingency of an existence without necessity” (ibid.) – a state that is 
called “happiness” (ibid.), which is grounded in “feeling oneself objectively, 
                                                             
5  See here also Prinz (2014, 30 ff.). 
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and therefore subjectively, endowed” (ibid.). The subjectively felt, the feeling 
of being more or less appreciated, is thus the objective, that which is decisive 
for analyzing social dominance. Hence, if symbolic capital is distributed une-
qually, fundamentally that means that just how much social subjects (can) feel 
appreciated, is distributed unequally. 
Therefore, (late) modern social class as classification struggles are about 
changing the categories of perception and appreciation in a way that one’s own 
existence is perceivable as valuable even by oneself. The opportunities to do 
this, however, are unequally distributed due to the unequal distribution of sym-
bolic capital – a vicious circle Bourdieu tries to capture with the term symbolic 
violence. This includes for example the fact that only “dominants always tend 
to impose the skills they have mastered as necessary and legitimate and to 
include in their definition of excellence the practices at which they excel” 
(Bourdieu 1996b, 119). In contrast, dominated groups can typically only per-
ceive themselves with categories of perception rendering them as appearing 
less valuable, so that within the social struggles of dominance they cannot 
move up those categories that are advantageous for them. Bourdieu points this 
out when writing that symbolic violence is a  
coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot 
fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) […] when the 
schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to 
perceive and evaluate the dominators […] are the product of the incorporation of 
the (thus naturalized) classifications of which their social being is the product. 
(Bourdieu 2000, 170) 
Additionally, this becomes clear when Bourdieu states that according to sym-
bolic violence, “dominated lifestyles are almost always perceived, even by 
those who live them, from the destructive and reductive point of view of the 
dominant aesthetic” (Bourdieu 1998, 9). In this way, ultimately it becomes 
apparent here that essentially that kind of subject can be considered as the 
legitimate (late) modern way of subjectivation that appreciates itself in terms of 
feeling appreciated, so that a norm of self-appreciation can be assumed for 
(late) modernity within Bourdieu’s theory (see also Matthäus 2014, 231). 
3.  Bourdieu’s Theory of Habitus: On Self, Worth, and 
Feelings 
3.1  Habitus – Subject – Structure 
Human affectivity and the connected relationship between appreciation and 
feeling appreciated does, however, not only play a decisive role in Bourdieu’s 
notion of (late) modern social order. In a theoretically stringent and substantiat-
ing way, it also plays an important role in his theory of habitus. However, 
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before we can get to that, three essential aspects of this theory have to be out-
lined. 
1) Due to Bourdieu’s general practice- and social dominance-theoretical 
framework, there are two fundamental ideas that apply also for his theory of 
habitus: 1) Every society is in principle divisible between a dominant and a 
dominated group; and 2) the (re-)production of social dominance is always 
dependent upon the actual activity of social subjects. In terms of these prac-
tice-theoretical considerations,6 Bourdieu’s theory is fundamentally a theory 
about “the mode of generation of practices” (Bourdieu 2013, 72). Therefore, 
Bourdieu is not so much interested in social practices themselves, but rather 
in the conditions, processes, and mechanisms of their emergence which he 
basically models as the “dialectic of the internalization of externality and 
the externalization of internality, or, more simply, of incorporation and ob-
jectification” (ibid.; original emphasis) within his concept of habitus. 
2) The habitus as such a “principle generating and unifying all practices” (ibid., 
124) is understood by Bourdieu as “an individual or a socialized biological 
body, or as the social, biologically individuated through incarnation in a 
body” (Bourdieu 2000, 157). Speaking of the habitus therefore means to not 
speak of an entity in the sense of an extra organ or the like, but of individu-
als as always becoming social beings, as essentialized and existentialized 
subjects. “The social world is essentialist” (ibid., 238), Bourdieu also states. 
Hence, he makes clear that when analyzing the (re-)production of social 
structures, especially in terms of structures of social dominance, the decisive 
level of analysis should be that which is generally considered to be essential 
or natural. That means that which most self-evidently seems good, valuable, 
despicable, or horrid, thus ultimately comprising those perceptions that 
make our world appear in a specific way for which the question of alterna-
tivity does not even seem to be possible. Consequently, the notion of habitus 
refers to the social molding of society’s members understood as their “sec-
ond nature” (Bourdieu 1996a, 474), and this in a twofold sense: On the one 
hand, Bourdieu’s theory of habitus captures the time and space specificity of 
the social subjects on the macro level as for example described in Section 2. 
On the other hand, it is focused especially on how these structures are (re-
)produced on the micro level by socialization practices as will be described 
in the following. Therefore, the social subject is always influenced by both – 
by the general structuring of society, for example in respect to what is con-
sidered a legitimate lifestyle or a legitimate subject; and in connection with 
that, by the structuring of a subject’s immediate society during (primary) so-
cialization particularly in the form of familial relationships, and therefore by 
the social position one is born into and the social trajectory covered since 
                                                             
6  For an introduction to and overview of practice theory see Hillebrandt (2014) and Schäfer 
(2015).  
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then. Hence, within the theory of habitus as laid out by Bourdieu, both the 
collective and the individual history are influencing the shaping of, the be-
coming of, and thus the being of social subjects.  
3) Although the habitus has been described as a specific scheme of perception, 
thought, and action, for our endeavor it is its more fundamental definition as 
a “structuring and structured structure” (ibid., 171) that is especially im-
portant, since it fully captures the notion of the theory of habitus being es-
sentially a theory about the production of practices. According to this defini-
tion, habitus is first of all defined as a structure – a structure, however, 
formed by structures and producing structures. In doing so, Bourdieu resorts 
to a basic definition of structure, perceiving it as a relatively constant way of 
relating between at least two elements, so that the concept of habitus essen-
tially refers to the relatively constant kind of a relationship between us and 
ourselves. This can be demonstrated, for example, when Bourdieu highlights 
that the “[h]abitus constructs the world by a certain way of orienting itself 
towards it” (Bourdieu 2000, 144), because an ‘orienting itself towards it’ 
implies an orienting taking place, hence a referring to oneself that orients 
oneself in a certain way towards the world. Thus, the specific relation be-
tween the actor-subject and itself produces a specific relation between the 
actor-subject and the world, which in turn always implies a specific act of 
the subject referring to itself. It is in this sense that Bourdieu describes the 
habitus as “a particular but constant way of entering into a relationship with 
the world” (ibid., 142). In consequence, speaking of different forms of habi-
tus essentially means speaking of different subject structures as in different 
self-/world-relationships (Matthäus 2014, 222). This means that, if one is in-
terested in the (re-)production process of (late) modern structures of social 
dominance, the objects of reference or distinct social practices are essential-
ly only important in connection with the way they are referred to or carried 
out. This can be seen also when Bourdieu refers to the habitually differenti-
ated tastes of the social classes that “cannot be considered in complete inde-
pendence of the other dimensions of the relationship to the world, to others 
and to one’s own body, through which the practical philosophy of each class 
is enacted” (Bourdieu 1996a, 193; emphasis added). So, in principle it is 
more important how something is referred to, e.g. tennis, opera, or ham-
burgers, than that it is referred to. Consequently, relational thinking plays a 
crucial role not only in identifying social classes as phenomena fundamen-
tally being in relation to each other, but also in Bourdieu’s conception of the 
social subject itself, as will be further demonstrated in the following analysis 
of Bourdieu’s considerations of affect in his theory of habitus.7 
                                                             
7  In reference to Gabriel’s argument that only Elias enables consequent relational thinking, I 
would like to point out that conceptualizing the subject itself as a relation is an extremely 
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3.2  Corporeal Affectivity 
As established so far, it is thus this subject structure that produces as a “modus 
operandi” (Bourdieu 1998, 55; original emphasis) our social practice as an 
“opus operatum” (ibid.; original emphasis), typically in a way that reproduces 
social dominance. With respect to the question of exactly how the subject 
structure does that, human affectivity comes into play. This is caused by our 
corporeal and therefore practical being-in-the-world that includes our emotions 
as the entity particularly connected with what is perceived as the essential and 
natural, as Bourdieu conceptualizes with reference to German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger:8  
With a Heideggerian play on words, one might say that we are disposed be-
cause we are exposed. It is because the body is (to unequal degrees) exposed 
and endangered in the world, faced with the risk of emotion, lesion, suffering, 
sometimes death, and therefore obliged to take the world seriously (and noth-
ing is more serious than emotion, which touches the depths of our organic be-
ing) that it is able to acquire dispositions that are themselves an openness to 
the world, that is, to the very structures of the social world of which they are 
the incorporated form. (Bourdieu 2000, 140-1; original emphasis) 
Therefore, it prevails that  
[w]e learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this per-
manent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic but is always 
largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions 
with the environment (ibid., 141),  
which, as shown above, in (late) modernity is a valuation system particularly 
with respect to the value of subjects, in which those subjects that feel appreci-
ated are perceived as more valuable. 
Consequently, the body in its capacity to feel is of special significance in 
Bourdieu’s thought, because it stores structures of the social world – the specif-
ic order of a society – in the form of subject structures, thus in form of specific 
ways subjects refer to themselves (ibid., 182-3). Bourdieu’s notion of the bodi-
ly hexis as “a basic dimension of the sense of social orientation, […] a practical 
way of experiencing and expressing one’s own sense of social value” (Bour-
dieu 1984, 474), highlights this especially. Therefore, Bourdieu speaks of “the 
values given body” (Bourdieu 2013, 94) and of embodied values as “placed 
                                                                                                                                
relational perspective that should not be dismissed too easily (see Gabriel 2017, this HSR 
Special Issue). 
8  For more information on the affinity between Bourdieu and Heidegger, see Koppetsch 
(2001), who concludes her analysis by stating the importance of Heidegger for practice-
theoretical thought in general and highlighting that only Bourdieu thought out consistently 
“the implications of Heideggerian existential philosophy with respect to an understanding 
of social practice” (ibid., 349; my translation). Moreover, Prinz (2014) shows how not only 
the existential philosophy by Heidegger, but also the phenomenology of the body by Mau-
rice Merlau-Ponty deeply influenced Bourdieu’s thought. 
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beyond the grasp of consciousness” (ibid.). For this reason and because bodily 
affective states are as part of the dominant (late) modern notion of a Cartesian 
subject seen as completely individual rather than representing the social struc-
ture and one’s own position therein (ibid., 63-4), they are most effective within 
the hidden process of reproducing structures of social dominance. This can be 
also seen when Bourdieu states that what is constituted during to the above-
mentioned bodily confrontation with the social world as basically a system of 
valuation categories is  
an immediate adherence, at the deepest level of the habitus, to the tastes and 
distastes, sympathies and aversions, fantasies and phobias which, more than 
declared opinions, forge the unconscious unity of a class (Bourdieu 1996a, 
77).  
Hence, it is exactly this unreflected, bodily-emotional way of being that is 
structured by structures of social dominance and that functions as their repro-
ducer. The self-/world-relationship is therefore always bodily constituted, and 
thus, according to Bourdieu, also always emotional, rendering all social prac-
tices ultimately as also being affective practices. 
So, due to the affective confrontation with the social order, the valuation 
categories central to the (re-)production process of social dominance permeate 
the body and in doing so the habitus; thus, they essentially shape how we refer 
to ourselves evaluatively which manifests itself in our feelings. Subsequently 
that also means that Bourdieu views our body and its feelings as more funda-
mental than our thinking consciousness with respect to the production of social 
practice (see also Bourdieu 2000, 137). In this regard, Bourdieu speaks about a 
“practical, non-thetic intentionality” (ibid., 143) which is “rooted in a posture, a 
way of bearing the body (a hexis)” (ibid., 144; original emphasis). It is there-
fore exactly the practical perception and recognition in terms of “the practical 
sense and the practical evaluations” (Müller 2014, 21; original emphasis; my 
translation) that are decisive for Bourdieu’s thinking about the (re-)production 
of social dominance in (late) modernity, implying that the values being referred 
to and evaluations being made remain mostly unconscious. Consequently, 
Bourdieu identifies the habitus as “the solution to the paradoxes of objective 
meaning without subjective intention” (Bourdieu 1990, 62), so that methodo-
logically the objective meaning of social practice is seen as at least equally 
important as the meaning the subjects themselves offer consciously (also see 
Bourdieu 2013, 81). 
3.3  Affect – Worth 
Moreover, Bourdieu describes the body as a “memory pad” (Bourdieu 2000, 
68) and “a repository for the most precious values” (Bourdieu 1990, 68), which 
implies that primary experiences have a special significance within Bourdieu’s 
theory. This becomes even clearer when Bourdieu further specifies the habitus 
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as “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten history 
[which] is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product” 
(Bourdieu 1990, 56), and also describing the unconscious as being “never 
anything other than the forgetting of history” (ibid.). Therefore, present pro-
cesses of confrontation with the social world are always already influenced by 
past such processes, during which evaluation categories get incorporated, espe-
cially with regard to self-evaluation categories. Hence, the present is always 
viewed in light of the past – a phenomenon for which Bourdieu coined the term 
“hysteresis effect” (Bourdieu 1996a, 142). For this reason, categories of per-
ception, which are also categories of evaluation and vice versa, that were in-
corporated during primary socialization, typically are of particular significance 
for the social subjects. Hence, the formation of subject structures always starts 
during childhood, not necessarily only beginning with actual birth (Bourdieu 
2000, 165).9 
Hence, the important affective confrontation with the social world that can 
be understood in terms of a process of subject structure formation in the sense 
of forming a specific practical relation between the subject and itself in com-
parison to the world happens during primary socialization, and thus in accord-
ance to the “material and cultural conditions of existence” (Bourdieu 2000, 
134) during that time. With regard to this process, referring especially to the 
“relatively autonomous universe of family relationships” (Bourdieu 2013, 78), 
Bourdieu especially highlights the translation of social structures into affective, 
familial structures of interaction that produce subject structures manifesting 
themselves in feelings (ibid.). To put it differently, Bourdieu assumes societal 
value judgements of the (immediate) company to be adopted as self-evaluations 
in the form of affects:  
But the social effects of the family-fatum, in other words the set of positive or 
negative verdicts pronounced on the child, performative statements of the be-
ing of the child which bring about what they state, or, more subtly and insidi-
ously, the whole set of silent censures imposed by the very logic of the do-
mestic order as a moral order, would not be so powerful or so dramatic if they 
were not charged with desire and, through repression, buried in the deepest 
level of the body where they are recorded in the form of guilts, phobias, or, in 
a word, passions. (Bourdieu 2000, 167; original emphasis)  
In specifying that, Bourdieu underlines in accordance to his overall construc-
tion of the habitus (see Section 3.1) that it is not only important what kind of 
recurring explicit verdicts or value judgements are vocalized by the primary 
caretakers, but rather how the child is typically being referred to as he states:  
                                                             
9  For this reason, with Bourdieu it is not only possible to think a “Sein-zum-Tode [Being-
toward-death]” (Bourdieu 2000, 239; original emphasis) that he himself wants to overcome 
in certain regards, but also a “Sein” grounded in birth and therefore in social relations 
(Schües 2008, 2016).  
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I am thinking in particular of all the demands and taboos – those, for example, 
that are implied in all acts of nomination […] – which, whether implicit, in-
sinuated or simply inscribed in the practical state in interactions, are addressed 
to the child and help to shape his representation of his (generic or individual) 
capacity to act, his value and social being. (ibid., 218)10  
Note here again the equivalent relation between social practice, value, affect, 
and the essentialized subjective being. 
As for the foundation of the significance of these value judgements Bour-
dieu again refers to the “search for recognition” (ibid., 166; original emphasis). 
However, since the child does not simply adopt the value judgements of his/her 
parents, but is “[i]n fact, […] continuously led to take the point of view of 
others on himself, to adopt their point of view so as to discover and evaluate in 
advance how he will be seen and defined by them” (ibid.), it becomes clear 
again that the appreciation of others is indeed primarily a social product of 
(late) modern social structures and not a universal fact. Moreover, the process 
of socialization is described as a transactional process “in which the child 
makes renunciations and sacrifices in exchange for testimonies of recognition, 
consideration and admiration” (ibid., 167), with this transactional process being 
“highly charged with affectivity” (ibid.). Children, according to Bourdieu, are 
therefore incorporating “the social in form of affects” (ibid.). 
Thus, that which is important on the structured side of the habitus in terms 
of a relation of the world towards the self is the way primary caretakers evalua-
tively refer to the child, because the child adopts these references and trans-
forms them into structuring self-references at the ‘deepest level of the body’ 
where they manifest themselves as feelings. Therefore, feelings themselves 
should be considered as social practice – as a social practice, however, that has 
a special capacity for motivating further social practices, as Bourdieu makes 
very clear when he talks about the ‘practical philosophy’ and the ‘unity of a 
class’ that is most importantly shaped by emotions (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
All kinds of feelings are therefore within the framework of Bourdieu’s theory 
basically conceptualized as a manifestation of a practical evaluative self-
/world-reference produced essentially by a specific evaluative referring of the 
world towards the self, so that they all can be understood as self.worth.feelings 
– a term that, however, refers ultimately to the inherent connection of the sub-
jectivated subject, social evaluation processes, and the subjects feelings (of 
being).11 Therefore, due to the fact that all social practice is a product of the 
                                                             
10  For a more empirical account, see the reconstruction of Lareaus (2002) study on child 
rearing practices of middle class and working poor families in Matthäus (2014, 234 ff.) 
11  This includes distinct emotions and feelings, but also and more importantly in following 
Ratcliffes (2005) Feeling of Being, "existential feelings", highlighting the fact that we as 
human subjects are always feeling somehow – a feeling that further motivates our social 
practice.  
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habitus, it is not only always affective, but also always evaluative as well. In 
turn, affects are always also an evaluative social practice. 
However, as already indicated, due to the hysteresis effect, subject structures 
and their subsequent feelings, once developed, do not change easily, because 
change requires “new experiences” (Bourdieu 2000, 161), while the habitus 
typically structures the perceptions of the world in its spirit. Furthermore, 
change “is never radical, because it works on the basis of the premises estab-
lished in the previous state” (ibid.). That means that perceiving a certain state-
ment as a kind offer of help or, in contrast, as an insinuation at one’s incompe-
tence, is primed by prior experiences due to one’s social background and social 
trajectory, as Bourdieu expresses pronouncedly when referring to the typical 
self-deprecating perceptions of the dominated:  
The passions of the dominated habitus […] are not of a kind that can be sus-
pended by simple effort of will, founded on a liberatory awakening of con-
sciousness. A person who fights his timidity feels betrayed by his body, which 
recognizes paralyzing taboos or calls to order, where someone else, the prod-
uct of different conditions, would see stimulating incitements or injunctions. 
(ibid., 179-80) 
What follows from this is on the one hand a certain independence of affective 
(re-)actions towards social situations, because affects are dependent upon a 
primary incorporated subject structure, as also Bourdieu himself points out:  
In a general way, the efficacy of external necessities depends upon the effica-
cy of an internal necessity. […] The practical recognition through which the 
dominated, often unwittingly, contribute to their own domination by tacitly 
accepting, in advance, the limits imposed on them, often takes the form of 
bodily emotion (shame, timidity, anxiety, guilt), often associated with the im-
pression of regressing towards archaic relationships, those of childhood and 
the family. (ibid., 169-70) 
On the other hand Bourdieu demonstrates here very clearly that so-called habi-
tus transformations are indeed possible, but also that they are bound to the 
bodily dimension of the subject’s being. Therefore, changes are not to happen 
because of conscious and cognitive considerations alone (ibid. 180), but are 
based on the bodily dimension of affective transactions with the social envi-
ronment, so that Bourdieu speaks of a bodily “countertraining” that answers the 
original “training of the body” (ibid., 172): “[S]ymbolic action cannot, on its 
own, without transformation of the conditions of the production and transfor-
mation of dispositions, extirpate bodily beliefs, which are passions and drives” 
(ibid., 180). For every process of habitus formation, thus also for every process 
of so-called habitus transformation, it is therefore the affective-evaluative 
transaction, the affective-evaluative dimension of interactions and rela-
tion(ship)s, that is ultimately decisive. Subsequently, once established subject 
structures in terms of the socially formed affective-evaluative practical percep-
tions of one’s own person can be overcome only if there are new, relatively 
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constant emotional experiences of valuation judgements countering those made 
during socialization processes (so far).12 
4.  Conclusion 
To conclude, in this article I have argued that within the Social Theory of 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu an implicit theory of affect can be found 
that offers not only a unique perspective on affective states with respect to 
theory building in general, but also enhances our understanding of the constitu-
tion and (re-)production of social order in (late) modernity, especially in terms 
of (late) modern social dominance. 
According to Bourdieu, affective states in general and in particular are fun-
damentally bodily phenomena included in the concept of bodily intentionality 
and therefore expressing a specific self-/world reference of the social subjects. 
To be more precise, this self-/world reference is a practical evaluative process 
produced by the practical evaluative references of the social world towards the 
self, of which those during primary socialization are of special importance. As 
an expression of this habitual subject structure, states of affect are an especially 
naturalized form of social practice and therefore especially suitable to motivate 
further social practices that typically reproduce social structures.13 Feelings, 
emotions, sensations, etc. conceptualized in this way, are thus not so much 
expressions of situative occurrences, but expressions of unconsciously learned 
ways of evaluating oneself in comparison to the world – they are 
self.worth.feelings, a term that marks the fundamental interconnection these 
three elements hold in (late) modern social practice according to Bourdieu’s 
social theory, as this article demonstrates. 
Therefore, with Bourdieu’s implicit theory of affect, one can explain why 
and how affects are an essential element of the (re-)production of social ine-
quality or social dominance in (late) modernity: As part of the incorporation of 
the material and cultural conditions of existence as produced by subject struc-
tures, which are structured due to practical evaluative references by the world 
towards the self especially during primary socialization, they  have the capacity 
to motivate social practices most effectively that are either self-selecting – such 
                                                             
12  An instructive example for this is provided by Schmeiser (1994, 1996), in his still seminal 
study on the life courses of professors, especially focusing on their social background. His 
data shows that processes of intragenerational upward mobility can be realized only under 
the condition of appreciative emotional references by close confidants for whom Schmeiser 
introduces the term “social godparents” (1996, 149; my translation). Moreover, his analysis 
demonstrates that the capacity of entering into such a relationship and therefore perceiving 
these appreciative refererences as such is dependent upon prior experiences, here especially 
in form of disruptions within the original habitat, to use a Bourdieusian term. 
13  See here also the conceptualization of Scheer (2012). 
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as quitting university due to perceptions like “I just didn’t feel like I fit in” 
(Lehmann 2007) – or serving as the basis for social selection processes by 
others, because they are perceived, for example, as “slavish, common,” “dull, 
boring, mediocre” (Bourdieu 1996b, 31) and thus less valuable on the one 
hand, or as “fine, ingenious, subtle, intelligent” (ibid.) and thus valuable and 
especially eligible on the other.  
For these reasons and also because Bourdieu’s implicit theory of affect 
shows fruitful similarities with recent developments within the philosophical 
discussion about the concept of “Affective Intentionality” (Slaby et al. 2011; 
Slaby 2008; Ratcliffe 2005) as well as with new psychoanalytical considera-
tions of the so-called intersubjective school (e.g. Atwood and Stolorow 1984; 
Orange et al. 2003; Jaenicke 2006),14 it enriches the social scientific discourse 
on emotions that is typically either rather focused on the norm-based manage-
ment of emotions and their discursive significance, and less on a profound 
definition of the actual object of investigation (e.g., Elias 1977; Hochschild 
1985; Illouz 2007, 2008), or concentrated on single, distinct emotions without 
going into human affectivity in general, its constitution and actual mode of 
operation (Scheff 1988; Neckel 1991; Barbalet 1998), which especially holds 
true for the rather individualistic and empiricist studies of self-worth and feel-
ings thereof (e.g. Sandmeier 2005; Trautwein 2003). Bourdieu in contrast pro-
vides us with a theoretically stringent definition of affective states in general 
and in particular that is even able to answer the so-called problem of individua-
tion that asks how emotions can systematically be differentiated, because emo-
tions according to Bourdieu are a specific way of the subject practically and 
evaluatively referring to itself and the world according to past experiences of 
evaluations by this world. Thus, emotions in Bourdieu’s theory are not lopsid-
edly understood as only cognitive phenomena (e.g. Nussbaum 2001) or as pre-
social energy (Massumi 2002), but as both bodily and intentional, structured 
and structuring. In this way, Bourdieu’s theory not only demonstrates the con-
nection between social positions and certain emotions (e.g. Kemper 1978; 
Heise 1979; and von Scheve 2009), but actually offers an explanation why 
social subjects according to their social background and trajectory, thus their 
social position, react differently due to different emotions to the same social 
situations, and how this typically leads to the reproduction of social inequality 
or social dominance in (late) modernity. 
Therefore, Bourdieu’s implicit theory of affect helps us to adequately ana-
lyze power relations and structures of dominance in the 21st century: First of 
all, Bourdieu offers us a sound hypothesis regarding subjects being able to refer 
to themselves appreciatively and thus feeling appreciated as the legitimate 
subject structure of (late) modernity. Secondly, with Bourdieu’s theory the 
                                                             
14  Aarseth, Layto and Nielsen (2016) point to a similar connection with regard to relational 
psychoanalysis. 
HSR 42 (2017) 4  │  89 
question of habitus formation as well as its transformation, i.e., the question of 
what kind of conditions lead to the production, reproduction, or change of 
social structures in (late) modernity and how these processes take place, can be 
answered more precisely. Habitus in (late) modernity are based on relatively 
persistent practical evaluative-affective references by the world and only 
change if referred to in manners differing from that. And thirdly, Bourdieu’s 
theory provides us with a theoretical framework that allows us to understand 
two typical late modern social developments in their interconnectedness – the 
increasing significance of emotionality on the one side, especially in the sense 
of understanding emotions as being an expression of our true inner selves 
(McCarthy 2002),15 and on the other side the proliferation of evaluation pro-
cesses implicitly or explicitly aimed at social subjects (e.g. Sauder and Es-
peland 2009) – as an increasing significance of self.worth.feelings in the  
(re-)production process of social domination in (late) modernity. 
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